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This paper investigates shareholder voting in the UK. The Directors’ Remuneration 
Report (DRR) Regulations of 2002 gave shareholders a mandatory non-binding vote on 
boardroom pay. First, using data on about 50,000 resolutions over the period 2002 to 
2007 we find that less than 10% of shareholders abstain or vote against the mandated 
Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRR) resolution. Second, investors are more likely to 
vote against DRR resolutions compared to non-pay resolutions. Third, shareholders are 
more likely to vote against general executive pay resolutions, such as stock options, long-
term incentive plans and bonus resolutions compared to non-pay resolutions. Forth, firms 
with higher CEO pay attract greater voting dissent. Fifth, there is little evidence that CEO 
pay is lower in firms that previously experienced high levels of shareholder dissent. In 
addition, there is little evidence that the equity pay-mix, representing better owner-
manager alignment, is greater in such firms. Currently, we find limited evidence that, on 






In this study we investigate the relation between UK shareholder voting and executive 
pay. The Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRR) Regulations, introduced in 2002, 
mandated boards of directors at public companies to produce a comprehensive 
remuneration report and submit it to an advisory shareholder vote at the firm’s Annual 
General Meeting (DRR 2002). The so-called ‘say on pay’ initiative was introduced by the 
UK government against a background of public outrage at rising levels of CEO 
compensation and a putative lack of transparency in pay packages. The DRR legislation 
gave shareholders a voice on pay: our study examines what they are saying and what it 
means. We contribute to a nascent research stream investigating UK shareholder voting 
on executive pay (Ferri and Maber 2009; Carter and Zamora 2009; Alissa 2009).  
 In principle, ‘say on pay’ initiatives promote shareholder activism, giving owners 
more power and influence to shape boardroom pay. Legislation giving shareholder 
“voice” has sprung up in many countries including the United Kingdom, Australia, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. At the time of writing, the debate on ‘say on pay’ is 
raging in the United States. Typically, the goal of such policies is to reduce managerial 
excess and mitigate concerns that pay packages are not designed in owners’ best interests. 
Executive pay remains a highly controversial subject, recently observed in the outrage 
over compensation paid to executives at many of the financial firms worst hit by the 
credit crisis. Critical questions remain as to whether levels of CEO pay are “too high” and 
overall pay packages are designed optimally (Kaplan 2008; Bebchuk and Fried 2006; 
Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Core and Guay 1999; Core et al. 2003). Shareholder voting 
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may be one mechanism to reduce alleged egregious pay packages (Cheffins and Thomas 
2001; Alissa 2009; Carter and Zamora 2009; Ferri and Maber 2009). 
Our study contributes to a broader literature on shareholder activism, including 
studies that specifically investigate voting on proposals initiated by shareholders 
themselves (Thomas and Martin 2000; Karpoff et al. 1996; Cai and Walkling 2009; 
Gillan and Starks 2000; Morgan and Wolf 2007; Carter and Zamora 2009; Del Guercio et 
al. 2008; Leech 2001; Thomas and Martin 1999; Becht et al. 2008; Ferri and Sandino 
2009; Martin and Thomas 2005). Few previous studies have examined the connection 
between shareholder voice and CEO pay in the UK. Notable recent exceptions include 
Ferri and Maber (2009), Carter and Zamora (2009) and Alissa (2009) which investigate 
shareholder voting in the UK. 
Case-study evidence suggests that shareholders are sufficiently concerned about 
CEO pay and express this through the voting mechanism (Deloitte 2004). Notably, the 
prominent British firm GlaxoSmithKline attracted adverse publicity during the first DRR 
proxy season of 2003. Shareholders, unhappy with the controversial compensation 
package for CEO Jean-Pierre Garnier, in particular his severance arrangements, which 
were perceived as ‘excessive’ in the media and out of line with CEO pay at other British 
firms, voted against acceptance of the Remuneration Report. The symbolism of the “no” 
vote ultimately resulted in a more shareholder-friendly pay package as well as significant 
changes in personnel at the company (Ferri and Maber 2009; Cai and Walkling 2009). 
Further cases of shareholder dissent have been well publicized in other British firms 
including Vodafone, ITV, Unilever, and Tesco.  However, it is far from clear whether 
these are just isolated cases of shareholder discord, or are symptomatic of more 
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widespread dissension. A study providing systematic evidence on British say on pay is 
clearly warranted. More importantly it provides insights to the general governance issue 
of how shareholders might vote on pay in other dominions and potential effects. 
 In this study we investigate shareholder activism in relation to executive pay by 
way of voting outcomes on resolutions at company general meetings. The study uses 
polling data for a large sample of UK firms for the six-year period from 2002 to 2007. 
The UK institutional context provides a fertile field experiment to test say on pay 
legislation. We investigate the factors that determine shareholder dissent. Given the 
Directors’ Remuneration Report voting resolution is mandatory our analysis avoids 
otherwise potentially important selection bias effects. 
Our study contributes to the extant literature in the following ways. First, we find 
that shareholder voting dissent on CEO pay is low. Typically, less than 10% of 
shareholders abstain or vote against the mandated Directors’ Remuneration Report 
(DRR) resolution. Over 90% of shareholders vote in favor of the DRR. Second, using 
data on about 50,000 resolutions over the period 2002 to 2007 we find that shareholders 
are more likely to vote against the Directors’ Remuneration Report compared to other 
non-pay resolutions such as the election of a director to the board. Third, investors are 
more likely to vote against general executive pay resolutions, such as stock options, long-
term incentive plans and bonus resolutions compared to other non-pay resolutions. Forth, 
firms with high CEO pay attract greater voting dissent. In general, our statistical models 
illustrate that investor voting (activism) is endogenous. Fifth, we find little evidence that 
CEO pay is lower in firms that previously experienced high levels of shareholder dissent. 
In addition, there is little evidence that the equity pay-mix, representing better owner-
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manager alignment, is greater in such firms. Overall, we find limited evidence that, on 
average, voting dissent materially alters the subsequent level and design of CEO pay.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next we consider the institutional 
context, related studies and the development of the hypotheses. We then describe the data 
and our econometric strategy. This is followed by the results and conclusions. 
 
II. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Voting and the Directors Remuneration Report (DRR) 
 Since the early 1990s the UK has introduced several pieces of legislation aimed at 
improving the accountability, transparency and performance of the corporate governance 
system. For example, the Cadbury Report (1992) addressed accountability and audit 
committee functions in the wake of notable bank failures such as BCCI. For the first time 
a minimum number of outside (independent) directors was recommended for boards of 
directors. The Greenbury Report (1995) resulted in wide-ranging changes to the 
disclosure of executive pay, especially regarding stock options, so that investors could get 
a more complete picture of the economic costs associated with equity grants. The 
Greenbury Report was also a response to widespread concern about excess pay in the 
then recently privatized utilities. These principles of UK corporate governance were then 
enshrined in the Hampel Report (1998). Subsequently, the Higgs Report (2003) made 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of non-executive (outside) directors. The 
report endorsed the “comply or explain” approach to UK corporate governance. This 
doctrine encourages firms to comply with best practice corporate governance, but leaves 
the door open for companies to deviate from the code. If the company deviates from the 
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rule it needs to explain why. The history of corporate governance policies in the UK since 
the 1990s can be viewed as a sequence of incremental steps aimed to mitigate problems 
and managerial malfeasance (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
The Director Remuneration Report (DRR) Regulations were introduced in the UK 
in 2002. The regulations were initiated as an amendment to the Companies Act of 1985, 
and subsequently were absorbed into the Companies Act of 2006. The new regulations 
significantly upgraded the information available to investors about executive pay and 
more importantly, also incorporated a requirement for the directors to seek approval from 
the shareholders for the DRR. Consequently, effective for companies with fiscal year 
ending on or after 31, December 2002, a resolution at their Annual General Meeting 
(AGM) seeking approval of the DRR became mandatory for all public companies. 
However, the regulations state that “No entitlement of a person to remuneration is made 
conditional on the resolution being passed” (Companies Act 2006, Section 439) and as 
such the resolution can only be considered advisory i.e. non-binding. However, a 
negative vote for the DRR still effectively amounts to a vote of no confidence in the 
firm’s remuneration policies and the Remuneration Committee itself. 
The Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRR) regulations required significant new 
executive compensation disclosure by firms. The most important information included 
naming the advisors to the board and compensation committee such as the name of the 
board’s remuneration consultants (Conyon et al. 2009b). Firms also had to disclosure 
details about executive service contracts, including contract duration and severance 
packages. They also had to supply a narrative on company policy on remuneration, 
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including a description of executive pay performance criteria (Ferri and Maber 2009; 
DRR 2002).  
 One important mechanism for shareholder voice in the UK is the capacity to vote 
on resolutions at the firm’s AGM. Management typically tables all resolutions at an 
AGM although shareholders can table their own resolutions but this requires a minimum 
5% share ownership or the co-ordination of 100 shareholders. Section 338 of the 
Companies Act 2006 governs the process (see subsection 3) and as such, shareholder 
requisitioned resolutions are rare. The actual outcome of a resolution can be formalized in 
several ways. For many years, non-contentious resolutions have been passed on a simple 
“show of hands” basis, where each member (or proxy thereof) present at the AGM has 
one vote regardless of the size of their shareholding. An Ordinary resolution, such as the 
approval of the DRR, requires a simple majority (i.e. greater than 50%) of hands voting 
for the resolution to be passed; a Special resolution requires 75% in favor to be passed. 
Other than asking questions of directors from the floor, this show of hands vote provides 
the most tangible way for the shareholders who have attended the AGM to provide a 
collective expression of their concerns and opinions. However, there is no guarantee such 
a vote will take place, and indeed this largely symbolic mechanism has in recent years 
began to disappear from AGMs. Typically shareholders can register their proxy vote in 
advance, either by post, or by email (if held in a nominee account) and indeed increasing 
numbers of companies now provide the provision for shareholders to vote via a website. 
 
Related studies  
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An early UK study by Conyon and Leech (1994) investigated the effect of 
shareholder power on CEO pay. They found weak evidence that greater shareholder 
control, lowered CEO pay but no evidence that shareholder power constrained the growth 
in pay. Recent research by Carter and Zamora (2009) estimates a shareholder voting 
model using UK data on FTSE350 firms between 2002 and 2006. They find that 
shareholders disapprove of higher salaries, weak pay-for-performance sensitivity in 
bonus pay and greater potential dilution in equity pay. They find some evidence that 
boards respond to past negative votes by reducing excess salary and dilution of stock 
option grants and also improving pay for performance links. Our paper is different in 
important respects because Carter and Zamora (2009) investigate shareholder voting on 
DRR resolutions only. In contrast, we investigate shareholder voting on all proposals 
(such as resolutions to elect or reelect directors and executives to the board) and evaluate 
how DRR voting differ from these other proposals. We also use data on all public 
companies, which extends beyond the FTSE350 companies in previous studies. Finally, 
we treat shareholder voting as an endogenous choice variable in our CEO pay equations. 
Ferri and Maber (2009) studied UK firms over the period 2000 to 2005 to test the 
effect of UK say on pay legislation on CEO pay for performance. They found no 
evidence of a change in the level or growth rate of CEO pay after the adoption of the UK 
say on pay regulations. However, they did find that there was an increase in the 
sensitivity of CEO cash and total compensation to negative operating performance, 
particularly in firms with excessive compensation in the period prior to the DRR 
regulations and in firms with high voting dissent. Again, different from Ferri and Maber 
(2009) we estimate a shareholder-voting model and treat this as an endogenous variable 
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in the estimation of our CEO pay equations. In addition, we do not conduct a “before and 
after” style test, but instead compare voting on DRR with other non-pay related voting 
resolutions.  
Contemporary US research by Ferri and Sandino (2009) finds that CEO 
compensation decreased in firms where a shareholder proposal to expense employee 
stock options was submitted. In addition, where the proposal gained greater shareholder 
votes, CEO pay subsequently declined. Alissa (2009) investigates say on pay in a sample 
of UK FTSE350 firms in fiscal year 2006 and finds that say on pay is associated with a 
reduction in excess compensation and greater CEO turnover. 
 
Research hypotheses 
 In contrast to previous ‘say on pay’ research we are able to compare shareholder 
voting on executive pay resolutions to voting on other non-pay resolutions. This is a 
significant feature of our study. Unlike prior studies we compare shareholder voting on 
the Directors’ Remuneration Report and/or other executive pay issues to shareholder 
voting on non-pay related resolutions. Shareholders typically vote on about ten different 
resolutions at a yearly company AGM. These include resolutions to accept the annual 
report and accounts, the election of directors to the board as well as the resolution relating 
to the directors’ remuneration report. Table 1 provides a case example for Glaxo-
SmithKline. 
We hypothesize that on average shareholder voting on pay-related resolutions will 
attract greater shareholder voting dissent compared to non-pay resolutions. First, unlike 
other types of shareholder resolutions (for instance on electing a director to the board or 
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approving a takeover), the resolution on the directors’ remuneration report (DRR) is non-
binding for the company. If a majority of shareholders vote against executive pay, the 
board could, in principle, ignore it. Shareholders’ can signal dissatisfaction about CEO 
pay knowing that the consequences may, in reality, not be too severe. Non-binding voting 
may therefore help align owner and manager interests is a cost-effective way. In contrast, 
a majority vote against the election of a director will lead to the loss of that person from 
the company – which may not have been the desired effect of the shareholders. 
Second, managerial power and rent seeking theories argue that CEO pay levels 
are too high and lead to general ‘outrage’ (Bebchuk and Fried 2003; Bebchuk and Fried 
2006; Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Increasingly, U.S. and U.K. policy makers are 
addressing boardroom pay. Indeed, the UK Directors Remuneration Report legislation 
was introduced, in part, as a response to perceived high levels and growth rates in CEO 
pay. CEO pay appears especially controversial compared to other types of corporate 
governance issues such as the routine election of officers to the board of directors. We 
therefore expect greater voting dissent on pay matters compared to other more routine 
governance issues. 
Third, voting against CEO pay has a clear alternative; namely to change the 
current pay package. Voting on other corporate governance issues may have less clear 
alternatives. For example, voting against the election of a board member may be much 
more difficult due the lack of close substitutes in terms of skills, the supply of qualified 
candidates etc.. The risks and unintended consequences for this voting strategy are 
potentially greater compared to simply signaling dissatisfaction by voting against pay. 
This discussion leads to our first hypothesis. 
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H1: Shareholder voting dissent is positively correlated to Director Remuneration 
Report (DRR) resolutions compared to non-DRR resolutions 
 
Our second hypothesis relates voting patterns on the directors’ remuneration report 
(DRR) to the observed levels of CEO pay. UK shareholders were given the opportunity 
to vote against pay packages they deemed unreasonable, excessive or egregious in 20002. 
If shareholders are content with company pay strategies then we expect CEO pay has no 
effect on the level of voting dissent. Shareholder dissatisfaction predicts that high levels 
of CEO pay are associated with greater shareholder voting dissent. This hypothesis is 
consistent with media reports that excessive CEO pay produces more shareholder (and 
public) unhappiness. It is also consistent with extant research (Carter and Zamora 2009). 
 
H2: Shareholder voting dissent on the Directors Remuneration Report (DRR) is 
positively correlated to executive pay 
 
 Finally, in addition to modeling shareholder voting, we also consider whether 
voting dissent on the Directors’ Remuneration Report is associated with the future level 
and structure of CEO compensation. Specifically, we consider whether CEO 
compensation this period is correlated with the shareholder dissent on the DRR last 
period. If voting against the DRR is effective, meaning that firms adjust their 
compensation policies in the light of negative voting, we would expect to see a negative 
association between CEO pay and DRR dissent (Carter and Zamora 2009). In addition, 
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we expect that voting dissent is associated with greater future alignment between owner 
and manager interests. To test this we investigate whether the CEO equity pay mix (the 
fraction of total pay made up of options and other equity pay) is greater in firms with 
greater prior voting dissent. Our analysis differs from previous research as we investigate 
the relation between voting outcomes and pay, and not only the introduction of legislation 
(Ferri and Maber 2009) and we consider a total measure of CEO pay which includes 
stock options and other equity pay, rather than the change in salary compensation (Carter 
and Zamora 2009). 
 
H3: CEO pay is negatively associated with prior high levels of dissent on the 
directors’ remuneration report (DRR). 
 
H4: CEO equity pay mix is positively associated with prior high levels of dissent 





 We investigate shareholder-voting behavior using UK data from 2002 to 2007. 
The polling data is supplied by a private sector research firm called Manifest Ltd, a 
proxy-voting agency based in the UK that provides corporate governance data. Manifest 
collect data on many aspects of corporate governance including the composition of 
boards of directors, biographical director and officer information, executive and director 
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compensation, and ownership structure. For the shareholder voting models we use 
information from all publicly traded firms in the Manifest data set.  The Manifest data has 
been used in previous research on ‘say on pay’ (Carter and Zamora 2009; Ferri and 
Maber 2009). However, for the CEO pay models we use a smaller subset of about 200 
large public firms in 2006 because we needed to separately hand collect all the stock 
option data to construct the CEO pay variable. We describe the CEO pay data more 
completely below.  
The unit of analysis in the shareholder voting models is the voting resolution: 
each firm has a number of resolutions per year. Examples of a voting resolution include 
the election of a director to the board, the reappointment of auditors, or a proposal to 
adopt the report and accounts of the company. We have the resolution narrative and from 
these we can identify the nature of the resolution. Each observation thus represents a 
“resolution-firm-year”. Each firm has several different resolutions to be voted in each 
year. In the data set the average (median) number of resolutions is about 10.5 (10.0) per 
AGM. In total, the sample contains 1958 unique publicly traded firms, although the 
number of firms per year can vary as firms enter or leave the data set. The initial data set 
contained 75,455 distinct “resolution-firm-year” observations. From these resolutions we 
had a smaller number of 51,263 complete observations on voting outcomes that we can 
use in the regressions. There are some missing observations for other right hand side 
variables included in the shareholder-voting regressions. The final data set for the voting 




Shareholder voting model 
 We estimate the following shareholder-voting model using panel data methods. 
Specifically, we use a GLS panel data random effects estimator, clustered on the firm 
identifier (Greene 2007; Wooldridge 2008). This controls for unobserved firm effects. 
 
Shareholder dissentijt = f(Directors Remuneration Reportijt, Pay Resolutionsijt, 
CEO Payjt, Controlsijt) (1), 
 
The dependent variable in the regressions is constructed from shareholder dissent on 
resolution i in firm j at time t. It is measured as the fraction of votes against a resolution 
plus the fraction of votes abstaining. It is consistent with prior research estimating 
shareholder-voting models which using a non-transformed outcome variable. These 
include Gillan and Starks (2000), Thomas and Cotter (2007), Morgan et al (2006), Carter 
and Zamora (2009).1 Our study contributes to extant research on shareholder voting 
(Thomas and Cotter 2007; Carter and Zamora 2009). Thomas and Cotter (2007) use the 
percentage of votes in favor of a shareholder resolution as the dependent variable because 
they are investigating support for shareholder-initiated proposals. Our empirical results 
are qualitatively unchanged using this alternative measure. 
 The independent variables are as follows. First, we define a dummy variable equal 
to one if the resolution relates in whole or in part to the Directors’ Remuneration Report 
(DRR) and zero otherwise. The variable is constructed from the narrative of the firm’s 
voting resolution. This is a labor-intensive process because the resolution narratives vary 
from firm to firm, even when they relate to the same topic, and can be several lines long. 
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For example, the resolution narratives relating to the DRR might state the following: “To 
adopt the remuneration report for the year ended 30 September 2007” or “To approve the 
report of the Remuneration Committee” or even “To adopt the report & accounts for the 
year ended 31 December 2005, and to approve the report of the Remuneration 
Committee”. Because of this we had to manually go through all resolutions in the data set 
(over 50,000 observations in total) to code each resolution separately.  
We classified all the resolution narratives into eleven distinct types: (1) 
Resolutions about directors: e.g. the election or re-election of a director. (2) Resolutions 
about major acquisitions or disposals: e.g. approving a merger or disposal of a significant 
asset. (3) Resolutions about auditors: e.g. appointing an auditor or approving the auditors’ 
remuneration. (4) Resolutions about equity: e.g. to approve changes to the share premium 
account, or to approve a share split. (5) Resolutions relating to the company: e.g. to 
change the company name, to wind up the company, approve a delisting, or to authorize 
donations. (6) Resolutions relating to dividends: e.g. to declare a dividend. (7) 
Resolutions relating to the articles of association: e.g. to amend or adopt new articles of 
association. (8) Resolutions relating to specific remuneration issues: e.g. to approve a 
share option plan, to amend along-term incentive plan, or to approve a grant of shares or 
options. (9) Resolutions that are contingent on the passing of one or more of the other 
mentioned resolutions first. (10) Resolutions relating to the report and accounts e.g. 
accepting them. (11) Resolution relating to the approval of the Directors’ Remuneration 
Report.  
 Second, the voting models contain an executive pay measure. We define 
executive compensation variable as the sum of salary, bonus and other cash 
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compensation. Unfortunately, for the large sample of firms in the voting models we 
cannot easily get executive option and other equity information and as such our figures 
for executive pay are lower bound estimates. We also define a number of further dummy 
variables if the resolution was about a specific executive pay issue, such as approving a 
share option scheme, amending a bonus plan or granting shares under a long-term 
incentive plan.  
 Our shareholder voting regressions contain a set of control variables. We control 
for whether the voting event was an emergency or annual general meeting by including a 
dummy variable for an emergency general meeting (EGM). EGM’s are expected to 
attract greater dissent. We include an indicator variable if the management is against the 
resolution, usually suggesting that that shareholder will heed management 
recommendations and vote against. We also include a firm size measure, calculated as the 
log of market value at the fiscal year end (Thomas and Cotter 2007). We further control 
for share ownership concentration (Thomas and Cotter 2007; Morgan et al. 2006). 
Ownership concentration is the percentage ownership of the largest off-board shareholder 
(the one-firm concentration ratio). Ownership stakes exceeding a 3% cut-off level are 
revealed in the report and accounts of UK firms. We also control for the level of insider 
ownership (Thomas and Cotter 2007; Morgan et al. 2006). Insider ownership is the 
proportion of shares owned by the management of the firm as disclosed in the annual 
report. We control for firm performance as the return on firm assets during the fiscal year 
(Thomas and Cotter 2007; Morgan et al. 2006). We control for board governance by 
including the proportion of outside directors and board size in the regression models 
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(Core et al. 1999). The regressions also contain a set of year dummy variables to net out 
macro-economic shocks and other economy wide factors. 
 
CEO compensation model 
 We estimate the following CEO compensation model using instrumental variable 
(IV) regression methods. CEO pay data from U.K. public companies in fiscal year 2006 
is used. The sample consists of the largest 200 firms based on market capitalization. The 
primary independent variable, shareholder-voting dissent on the Directors’ Remuneration 
Report (DRR), is endogenous. In consequence, the OLS estimator is biased even 
asymptotically (Greene 2007; Wooldridge 2008) and therefore we instrument voting 
dissent. The CEO pay model is specified as: 
 
CEO payj,t+1 = f(Shareholder Voting Dissent on Payjt, Firm Sizejt, Firm 
Performancejt, Controlsjt) (2), 
 
The CEO pay data for this model was hand-collected from annual reports and accounts. 
CEO pay in firm j and time t+1 is measured as the sum of salary, bonus, benefits, stock 
options, restricted stock grants (valued at 70% of performance contingent awards), and 
other compensation. Consistent with previous executive pay research the granted options 
are valued using the Black and Scholes pricing model: c = Se-qtN(d1) – Xe-rtN(d2), where 
d1 = (ln(S/X) + (r-q+σ2/2)t) / σ√t, d2 = d1 - σ√t, and S is the stock price; X the exercise 
price; t the maturity term; r the risk-free interest rate; q the dividend yield and σ the 
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volatility of returns. N(.) is the cumulative probability distribution function for a 
standardized normal variable (Black and Scholes 1973; Murphy 1999).  
We used a limited sample of public firms because we could not get the option and 
other equity data for the larger set of firms. Previous literature has pointed out that it is 
difficult to get such large samples of data on UK CEO equity grants (such as options) 
because of the lack of a European equivalent to the US Execucomp database (Conyon et 
al. 2009a). The sample used in this section is a cross-section of UK publicly traded firms 
in 2006. The firms are drawn from the population of the 200 largest firms, ranked by 
market capitalization. Complete CEO pay information was hand collected on all these 
firms (Cadman et al. 2008; Conyon et al. 2009b; Murphy and Sandino 2008; Conyon and 
Murphy 2000). 
 As noted the independent variable is voting dissent, which is treated as 
endogenous. The right hand side variables are all lagged by one period to further mitigate 
endogeneity problems. The CEO pay regression models contain a set of economic and 
human capital control variables that have been used in prior research (Conyon et al. 
2009b). CEO pay studies control for the size of the company, which is generally taken to 
reflect the returns to organizational complexity (Core et al. 1999; Murphy 1985). 
Consistent with these, the log of firm sales was used in the regression models. The 
economic determinants of CEO pay include company performance, reflecting the 
potential alignment of executive and shareholder interests (Murphy 1985; Murphy 1999). 
This was measured as total returns to shareholders (share price appreciation plus 
dividends). The book-to-market ratio was included as an inverse measure of growth 
opportunities within the firm (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). CEO pay models also included 
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stock volatility, measured as the standard deviation of annualized monthly stock returns 
over the prior calendar year. This was included as risk-averse executives might require 
greater compensation in more risky environments. The human capital variables included 
were CEO tenure and CEO age, to reflect the CEO’s skill and experience. The quality of 
board governance variables was controlled using the proportion of non-executive 
directors and board size (Core et al. 1999). Finally, a set of industry indicator variables 
were included as controls for between industry variation in the demand for executive 
talent (Core et al. 1999). We control for boardroom pay setting institutions by including a 
dummy variable for compensation consultants (Conyon et al. 2009b). 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 Table 1 illustrates the results of shareholder voting at the (controversial) 
GlaxoSmithKline Annual General Meeting in May 2003. There are seventeen unique 
resolutions. The DRR regulations yielded, for the first time, a resolution to approve the 
report of the remuneration committee (Resolution 2 in the table). The management 
recommended a vote “for” all the resolutions, including the approval of the DRR. The 
outcome of the voting, however, signaled shareholders displeasure with the way 
executive compensation had been handled at the firm. There were 1,398,142,951 votes 
cast in favor of the resolution (36.9%), 957,568,920 abstentions (25.2%) and 
1,439,003,920 votes against approving the DRR (37.9%). The distribution of shareholder 
votes signaled significant shareholder disquiet over CEO pay at GlaxoSmithKline and 
while the shareholder vote was non-binding, ultimately it did lead to a change in 
compensation strategy. 
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 It is noteworthy, that the shareholder backlash against CEO pay was not entirely 
observed in a pronounced way for the other resolutions. The worst showing for any other 
resolution, perhaps not unsurprisingly, was for the re-election of the CEO Dr. Garnier 
(Resolution 4) but even here the resolution gained 75% support and almost all other 
resolutions were passed with over 90% support. The case illustrates that shareholders are 
prepared to signal dissatisfaction by voting against pay, but not to the degree of removing 
directors. 
Table 2 shows the level of shareholder dissent for each of our eleven categories of 
company resolution. The mean, standard deviation and inter-quartile range (p25 to p75) 
are reported. We find that the absolute level of shareholder dissent on the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report (DRR) is in fact very low. Overwhelmingly, shareholders vote in 
favor of the DRR and, in this sense, are satisfied with company executive pay policies. 
We found that average dissent, namely shareholders who abstain or vote against the DRR 
resolution, is only about seven to ten percent over the sample period. Typically, over 
ninety percent of shareholders vote in favor of the Directors’ Remuneration Report.  
However, the figures in Table 2 do suggest that of all resolutions, those relating to 
executive pay are among the most likely to be voted against, with categories number 8 
(specific pay resolutions) and 11 (DRR) recording the highest mean level of dissension of 
all eleven resolution groups. Unsurprisingly the declaration of dividends is the most 
supported resolution amongst shareholders, with on average a dissension rate of only 
0.4%. Importantly, resolutions about mergers and acquisitions, although a small number 
of the resolutions, also attract relatively high shareholder dissent. 
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Figure 1 shows the time series of shareholding voting dissent from 2002 to 2007. 
The upper line is the percentage of shareholder dissent on DRR and other executive pay 
resolutions. The lower line is dissent on non-DRR and non-pay resolutions. On average 
investors are more likely to vote against pay resolutions. We find that shareholder dissent 
on the Directors’ Remuneration Report has been falling over time. The corollary is that 
shareholder approval has been increasing. Dissent on non-DRR proposals appears stable 
over time. 
We find that say on pay proposals (“DRR resolutions”) attract more dissenting 
votes than routine votes to elect directors or other forms of resolutions. While it is 
important to document this fact, it is also significant for corporate governance. None of 
the shareholder resolutions attracts much dissent except in rare cases, so why one might 
ask why does it matter to boards of directors that DRR resolutions get more negative 
votes than other resolutions? One reason is that it may reduce managerial agency costs. 
There is a sense that shareholders who vote the directors down will get another slate of 
directors who look much the same. That is, it’s not a vote with a clear counterfactual.  
Voting ‘no’ doesn’t explain who replaces the current slate. It is hard to know enough 
about the candidates to be sure what signal you are sending by voting them down. Voting 
“no” on pay, on the other hand, has a clearer meaning. 
 
Shareholder voting model: regression results 
 Table 3 contains the multivariate regression results. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is voting dissent by shareholders. This is defined as votes against the 
resolution plus the number of votes abstained all divided by the total number of votes 
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cast.  The models in columns 1 and 2 are estimated for all resolution types. The model in 
column 3 is restricted to the set of directors’ remuneration report (DRR) resolutions. 
The finding in Column 1 further illustrate that shareholder dissent is greater for 
resolutions relating to the directors’ remuneration report compared to all other 
resolutions, such as electing a director to the board or changing the articles of association 
(p<0.01). This confirms our hypothesis. In column 2 we add a linear time trend and an 
interaction variable between the time trend and the DRR dummy variable. The negative 
coefficient on the time trend implies that shareholder dissent on all resolutions has been 
declining over the sample period. What is more interesting is the interaction term. Dissent 
on the director remuneration report (DRR) has been falling over time beyond the general 
trend in shareholder voting patterns. The change in voting dissent on the director 
remuneration report over time is significantly negative. The multivariate results confirm 
the pattern of voting behavior observed in Figure 1. 
In Column 3 we add the log of executive pay to the estimating equation. The 
estimation of the voting model is now restricted to observations on the set of director 
remuneration report (DRR) resolutions only. We find that shareholder dissent on DRR 
reports is greater in firms with greater executive compensation (p<0.01). Our hypothesis 
is confirmed. Greater levels of executive pay are associated with an increased likelihood 
of voting dissent by shareholders on the DRR. The result is consistent with other 
contemporary research (Carter and Zamora 2009). 
 The control variables add further insight into the endogenous nature of 
shareholder voting. There is more shareholder dissension if the meeting is an Emergency 
General Meeting (p<0.01), if management is against the resolution (p<0.01) and the 
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larger is the firm (p<0.01). There is less dissension (i.e. more investor approval of 
resolutions) the more concentrated is institutional ownership is (p<0.01), the more 
concentrated is board ownership (p<0.05) and the greater is firm performance (p<0.01). 
The signs seem to reflect the economic benefits and costs to investors. 
 In Table 4 we investigate the relation between shareholder dissent and pay 
resolutions in general (as opposed to voting on the directors remuneration report 
directly). In Column 1 we find that resolutions about stock options attract increased 
shareholder dissatisfaction (p<0.01). However, the option resolutions can be broken 
down into the resolutions about different types of options. Executive Stock Option 
Schemes (ESOS) are specifically designed for high-level executives in the firm and their 
use is restricted to such key employees. On the other hand Save as You Earn (SAYE) 
options are open to all company employees, not just executives. We can therefore 
investigate shareholder reactions to narrow ESOS schemes compared with broader and 
deeper SAYE schemes. We might hypothesize that executive options might attract more 
outrage and dissent compared to broad-based employee stock options. The results 
indicate that indeed it is executive options that attract shareholder dissatisfaction. The 
negative coefficient on the SAYE variable implies shareholders vote in favor of these 
company wide broad-based option initiatives.  
We find that shareholder dissent increases with Long Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) 
resolutions (Column 3) and with resolutions about executive bonus plans (Column 4). 
Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs) are incentives provided by the allocation of 
performance-based shares to a recipient. In the final column the full model illustrates the 
general results that shareholder dissent is greater for pay related resolutions compared to 
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other resolutions. We note that the other control variables are qualitatively similar to 
those in the previous table. 
 
CEO compensation model: regression results 
Our next set of tests investigates the relation between CEO compensation and shareholder 
voting dissent. Table 5 shows the relation between CEO pay at time t and shareholder 
dissent in the previous period. Because shareholder dissent is endogenous, as noted 
earlier instrumental variable (IV) methods are used (Greene 2007; Wooldridge 2008). A 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is used. The instrument set includes 
variables from the shareholder-voting model. The identification restriction for the lagged 
shareholder dissent variable is pre-dated shareholder dissent. So, shareholder dissent in 
2005 is instrumented with values of dissent in 2004. 
The results show little evidence of a relation between CEO pay and shareholder 
dissent on the directors’ remuneration report (DRR). In Column 1 there is a no 
statistically significant relation between CEO salary and DRR dissent. This suggests that 
boards do not revise downwards CEO salary after receiving an adverse signal about 
remuneration policy. Similarly, there is no evidence that CEO cash pay, defined as salary 
plus bonus, is reduced following DRR dissent. The coefficient on the dissent variable in 
Column 2 is not significant at conventional levels. In column 3 we find a significant 
positive correlation between total CEO pay and dissent, opposite to what we expected. 
The significance is, however, weak at conventional levels. 
Our final test investigates the relation between the fraction of pay made up of 
equity compensation and shareholder voting. The final column in Table 5 shows that 
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there is no relation between the fraction of total pay made up of long-term incentives or 
stock options and DRR dissent. We might have expected that following a negative 
shareholder vote in previous periods boards might align CEO pay and shareholder 
interest by giving more performance pay. This does not happen. Maybe it is not that 
surprising because we do find in the shareholder voting model that investors are more 
likely to vote against executive option packages anyway. This might mean that there are 
no pressures to change this element of CEO compensation. 
The results in this study are partially consistent with extant research investigating 
CEO pay outcomes and shareholder voting in the UK since the year 2000. Ferri and 
Maber (2009) do not explicitly investigate shareholder voting, but find that the 
introduction of DRR legislation did not affect the level or growth of CEO pay in the UK. 
Carter and Zamora (2009) find some evidence that negative voting curbs excess salaries. 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
In this section we provide a sensitivity analysis of the basic CEO compensation results. 
Previously we examined the implications of the DRR resolution votes on CEO pay but 
found relatively little evidence of a negative effect of voting on subsequent CEO pay 
levels. We now consider exploring a subset of the DRR resolutions where the level of 
shareholder dissent is “high” to see if there are more pronounced reactions of executive 
pay to these votes. To identify firms where there is high voting dissent on directors’ 
remuneration reports, we defined a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was in the 
top quartile of dissent; zero otherwise. This empirical strategy follows Ferri and Maber 
(2009). We then estimated the previous CEO pay equations separately for the “high” 
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dissent firms and the remainder “low” dissent firms. The results are contained in Table 6 
(columns 1 and 2). We find that in the “high” dissent firms there is no statistical 
correlation between CEO pay and shareholder dissent on pay. Similarly, there is no 
correlation between CEO pay and the shareholder dissent in the “low” dissent group. So, 
even though pay is not significantly lower in the high dissenting firms, it is also not 
greater.  
As a second sensitivity test we investigated the relation between CEO pay and 
“excess pay”. We calculated “excess pay” along the lines of Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker (1999) and Ferri and Maber (2009), then see if high dissenting votes led to 
reductions in excess pay. To identify “excess pay” firms we estimated the CEO pay 
equation defined by equation (2). We calculated the residuals from this regression 
equation and ranked them. The greater the residual the further is the firm from the 
predicted regression line, conditional on the underlying economic model. Firms with 
residuals in the top quartile were defined as “excess pay” firms. We then estimated the 
CEO pay equation separately for the “excess pay” firms and the remainder “non-excess 
pay” firms. Again, the results are contained in Table 7 (columns 3 and 4). We find no 
evidence that CEO pay is negatively correlated with previous shareholder voting dissent 
in firms with greater in firms with “excess pay”. A qualitatively similar effect is observed 
for the sample of “non-excess pay” firms. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 This study has examined shareholder voting in UK firms. The 2002 Directors’ 
Remuneration Report (DRR) regulations gave shareholders the right, for the first time, to 
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vote on the firm’s remuneration report. We used a large sample of U.K. public firms over 
the years 2002 to 2007 covering approximately 50,000 separate voting resolutions to 
investigate what shareholders are saying. Using polling data on votes cast at company 
meetings we were able to determine whether the new DRR, or other executive pay 
resolutions, are associated with greater voting investor dissent. 
 We found that the absolute level of shareholder dissent on the Director 
Remuneration Report (DRR) is in fact very low. Overwhelmingly, shareholders vote in 
favor of the Directors’ Remuneration Report and, in this sense, are satisfied with 
company executive pay policies. We found that average dissent, namely shareholders 
who abstain or vote against the DRR resolution, is only about seven to ten percent over 
the sample period. Typically, over ninety percent of shareholders vote in favor of the 
Directors’ Remuneration Report. Importantly, we also found that shareholder dissent 
(approval) on the Directors’ Remuneration Report has been falling (increasing) over time. 
 Our study also compared voting outcomes for resolutions on the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report, and other executive pay proposals, to voting outcomes on non-pay 
related resolutions, such as electing a director to the board, appointing auditors or 
amending the firm’s share capital. Importantly, we found significant differences between 
the different groups. Our univariate results showed that shareholders are much more 
likely to vote against the Directors Remuneration Report (DRR), as well as other pay 
resolutions, compared to other types of non-pay related resolutions. 
 We furthermore examined the determinants of shareholder voting. The regression 
results from the shareholder-voting model showed that DRR resolutions attracted greater 
dissent (namely votes against or abstentions) compared to non-DRR resolutions. We 
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found that companies with high executive pay were more likely to attract greater 
shareholder dissent, especially on resolutions relating to the Directors’ Remuneration 
Report. Our results here are consistent with extant research on shareholder voting (Carter 
and Zamora 2009). The results also show that shareholders are more likely to vote against 
the DRR compared to board election resolutions, suggesting that DRR is a way to signal 
shareholder dissatisfaction to the firm about pay. 
 Beyond these findings on DRR, we also show that other executive pay resolutions 
also attract more dissention compared to other non-pay resolutions. This is especially the 
case for executive stock option programs, executive bonuses, and executive long-term 
incentive plans where there is greater voting dissent by investors. However, we found 
that it is not stock options per se that investors are wary of because they were less likely 
to vote against company-wide Save As You Earn (SAYE) option resolutions available for 
all employees. The concern seems to be about stock options and equity payments to 
executives. 
 Finally, we investigated the relation between voting and subsequent CEO pay 
levels. There is little evidence that shareholder say on pay has consequences for 
subsequent CEO compensation practices. Since shareholder voting is endogenous, we 
provided instrumental variable estimates of the relation between CEO pay and voting 
dissent on the DRR. We found little evidence of a (negative) relation between CEO total 
pay and voting dissent, where total pay also included equity payments such as stock 
options. The same result was found for cash measures of pay too. Our results compliment 
the growing empirical evidence on shareholder voting and UK CEO pay (Ferri and 
Maber 2009; Carter and Zamora 2009; Alissa 2009). 
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Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 Our study contains a number of potential limitations. First, it investigates the time 
period from 2002 to 2007. Since then the world has experienced a severe economic crisis. 
It is plausible that in the post-financial crisis Director Remuneration Report resolutions 
will be an even hotter topic for shareholders, especially at companies that are receiving 
any financial support from governments. The crisis may well spur greater shareholder 
activism and changes in dissent levels. Unfortunately, our data stops in 2007. A clear 
avenue for future research is how shareholder dissent and activism has changed due to the 
financial crisis. Second, in the UK, there are third-party voting advisors that issue 
recommendations to their clients about how to vote on among other things DRR 
resolutions. Ideally we would wish to include these as independent variables in the voting 
models, but data unavailability precluded this. We would encourage further investigation 
in this area since US research finds they have a potential impact (Alexander et al. 2009). 
Despite these potential limitations our study contributes significantly to a nascent 
research literature investigating the shareholder ‘say on pay’ (Alissa 2009; Carter and 
Zamora 2009; Ferri and Maber 2009). We present unique new evidence on the 
determinants of shareholder voting in the UK and especially the pattern of voting. We 
also show how voting affects executive compensation. We hope this study provides the 
impetus for further research on the relation between shareholder activism and CEO pay. 
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1 3,476,455,197 146,103,704 172,154,655 91.61% 3.85% 4.54% 3,794,713,556 
2 1,398,142,951 957,568,920 1,439,003,920 36.84% 25.23% 37.92% 3,794,715,791 
3 3,512,549,248 204,944,274 77,220,034 92.56% 5.40% 2.03% 3,794,713,556 
4 2,837,194,148 347,721,735 609,799,658 74.77% 9.16% 16.07% 3,794,715,541 
5 3,271,098,730 243,660,480 279,956,581 86.20% 6.42% 7.38% 3,794,715,791 
6 2,947,121,853 347,173,585 500,418,118 77.66% 9.15% 13.19% 3,794,713,556 
7 3,550,398,820 126,184,974 118,117,260 93.56% 3.33% 3.11% 3,794,701,054 
8 3,459,759,457 217,136,075 117,805,522 91.17% 5.72% 3.10% 3,794,701,054 
9 3,401,184,976 321,676,593 71,839,485 89.63% 8.48% 1.89% 3,794,701,054 
10 3,692,961,313 35,528,740 66,211,001 97.32% 0.94% 1.74% 3,794,701,054 
11 3,692,827,694 35,537,579 66,335,781 97.32% 0.94% 1.75% 3,794,701,054 
12 3,632,843,642 96,860,249 65,009,665 95.73% 2.55% 1.71% 3,794,713,556 
13 3,511,733,511 123,682,425 159,297,520 92.54% 3.26% 4.20% 3,794,713,456 
14 3,582,829,535 178,659,807 33,184,974 94.42% 4.71% 0.87% 3,794,674,316 
15 3,452,000,341 17,153,987 212,896,986 93.75% 0.47% 5.78% 3,682,051,314 
16 3,761,514,669 4,426,540 28,733,107 99.13% 0.12% 0.76% 3,794,674,316 
17 3,614,549,832 155,832,969 24,330,655 95.25% 4.11% 0.64% 3,794,713,456 
 
Shareholder voting at GlaxoSmithKline Annual General Meeting on 19th May, 2003. 
Management recommended voting for all the resolutions. ‘Res’ is the resolution 




Res # Resolution Narrative 
1 To adopt the report & accounts for the year ended 31 December 2002 
2 To approve the report of the Remuneration Committee 
3 To re-elect as a director, Sir Christopher Hogg 
4 To re-elect as a director, Dr Jean-Pierre Garnier 
5 To re-elect as a director, Sir Roger Hurn 
6 To re-elect as a director, Mr John Coombe 
7 To re-elect as a director, Sir Peter Job 
8 To re-elect as a director, Mr John McArthur 
9 To re-elect as a director, Mr Donald McHenry 
10 To re-elect as a director, Sir Ian Prosser 
11 To re-elect as a director, Dr Ronaldo Schmitz 
12 To re-elect as a director, Dr Lucy Shapiro 
13 To appoint as auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
14 To authorise the directors to determine the auditor's remuneration 
15 To authorise the Company to make EU Political Donations and to incur EU Political 
Expenditure 
16 To approve a general authority to the directors to dis-apply pre-emption rights on the 
issue of shares for cash 
17 To allow the Company to make market purchases of its own shares 
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Table 2: Shareholder dissent and company resolutions  
 
Resolution N Mean sd p25 p50 p75 
       
1.  Director 15,404 3.02 7.90 0.08 0.54 2.27 
2.  Acquisition or disposal of assets 510 6.57 16.25 0.15 0.53 3.22 
3.  Auditors 5,865 1.29 3.17 0.04 0.35 1.35 
4.  Shares 9,901 1.48 5.11 0.04 0.19 0.83 
5.  Company name 1,337 5.45 9.08 0.48 2.41 6.26 
6.  Dividends 3,251 0.40 2.63 0.00 0.01 0.14 
7.  Articles of Association 1,379 2.29 7.80 0.08 0.37 1.43 
8.  Remuneration 1,932 6.66 9.54 0.69 2.99 8.36 
9.  Related 2,586 2.25 6.76 0.04 0.22 1.11 
10. Report & Accounts 4,377 1.48 3.93 0.02 0.30 1.53 
11. Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRR) 3,640 7.61 10.40 0.93 3.58 10.01 
       
Total 50,182 2.73 7.16 0.05 0.40 1.98 
       
 
This table shows shareholder dissent by company resolution. Dissent is measured as the 
percentage of votes against the resolution plus the percentage of votes abstained. The 
mean, standard deviation and inter-quartile range (p25 to p75) are reported. Resolutions 
are (1) Resolutions about directors: e.g. the election or re-election of a director. (2) 
Resolutions about mergers and acquisitions: e.g. approving a merger or disposal of an 
asset. (3) Resolutions about auditors: e.g. proposals to appoint or reappoint an auditor or 
to approve the auditors’ remuneration. (4) Resolutions about shares e.g. to approve 
changes to the share premium account, or to approve a share split. (5) Resolutions 
relating to the company. e.g. to change the company name, to wind up the company, to 
approve a delisting, to authorize charitable donations. (6) Resolutions relating to 
dividends. e.g. to declare a dividend, a special dividend, or zero dividend. (7) Resolutions 
relating to the articles of association: e.g. to amend or adopt new articles of association. 
(8) Resolutions relating to remuneration: e.g. to approve a share option, bonus or long-
term incentive plan; to approve changes to share option or long term incentive plans. (9) 
Resolutions that are contingent on the passing of one of the other mentioned resolutions 
first. (10) Resolutions relating to the report and accounts e.g. accepting them. (11) 











This figures shows shareholder dissent by company year. Dissent is measured as the 
percentage of votes against the resolution plus the percentage of votes abstained. Pay 
Resolutions (upper line) are those related to the Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRR), 
resolutions on share options, on long-term incentive plans and resolutions related to 
bonuses. Non-Pay Resolutions (lower line) are other resolutions such as electing 







Table 3: Shareholder voting dissent and director remuneration report (DRR) resolutions 








Director Remuneration Report (DRR) resolution 5.72*** 9.46***  
 (0.18) (0.50)  
Time trend  -0.12***  
  (0.03)  
DRR × time trend  -0.98***  
  (0.12)  
Log executive pay   1.75*** 
   (0.58) 
Controls    
Emergency general meeting 1.47*** 1.46*** -2.73 
 (0.21) (0.21) (1.70) 
Log market capitalization -0.00 0.00 0.21 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) 
Ownership concentration -0.91** -0.89** -6.23*** 
 (0.39) (0.39) (1.59) 
Board ownership -0.52* -0.54* -3.19* 
 (0.30) (0.31) (1.65) 
Return on assets -1.48*** -1.50*** -4.04** 
 (0.40) (0.43) (1.90) 
Proportion of non-executives 0.00** 0.00** 0.05*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Board size 0.02* 0.02* -0.06 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
Management against res. 70.04*** 70.03***  
 (2.01) (2.01)  
Constant 1.50** 2.39*** -18.94*** 
 (0.60) (0.57) (6.40) 
Observations 44,787 44,787 3,312 
R-squared 0.499 0.499 0.141 
Number of companies 1623 1623 1039 
 
The table shows the determinants of shareholder dissent. The dependent variable is shareholder 
dissent: votes against the resolution plus abstentions divided by total votes cast. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates, clustered on the firm identifier. Directors’ 
Remuneration Report (DRR) is a dummy variable equal to one for the DRR resolution. Trend is a 
linear time trend. Log executive pay is the sum of salary, bonus and other cash compensation. 
The controls are: Emergency General Meeting is a dummy variable if event meeting is not an 
Annual General Meeting (AGM); Management against res is a dummy variable if management 
recommends voting against the resolution; Log market capitalization is the log of the firm market 
value at year end; ownership concentration is the percentage ownership of the largest shareholder; 
board ownership is the percentage ownership of the board of directors; return on assets is the 
profit to asset ratio. Proportion of non-executives percentage of outside directors on the board; 
board size is the number of directors on the board *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Option resolution 3.82***    3.95*** 
 (0.38)    (0.38) 
ESOS resolution  6.33***    
  (0.55)    
SAYE resolution  -0.70***    
  (0.24)    
LTIP resolution   4.63***  4.72*** 
   (0.32)  (0.32) 
Bonus resolution    2.03*** 2.24*** 
    (0.65) (0.65) 
Controls      
Emergency general meeting 0.92*** 0.91*** 0.83*** 1.05*** 0.68*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) 
Log market capitalization 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ownership concentration -0.81** -0.84** -0.83** -0.85** -0.79** 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) 
Board ownership -0.54* -0.56* -0.54* -0.56* -0.52* 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) 
Return on assets -1.36*** -1.36*** -1.37*** -1.37*** -1.36*** 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) 
Proportion of non-executives 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Board size 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Management against res. 70.05*** 70.01*** 70.05*** 69.91*** 70.20*** 
 (2.00) (2.00) (1.99) (2.00) (1.99) 
Constant 1.98*** 1.99*** 2.23*** 2.06*** 2.18*** 
 (0.54) (0.55) (0.56) (0.55) (0.55) 
Observations 44,787 44,787 44,787 44,787 44,787 
R-squared 0.506 0.503 0.501 0.501 0.506 
Number of companies 1623 1623 1623 1623 1623 
 
The table shows the determinants of shareholder dissent. The dependent variable is shareholder dissent: 
votes against the resolution plus abstentions divided by total votes cast. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis below the coefficient estimates, clustered on the firm identifier. Option resolution is a dummy 
equal for any option resolution.  SAYE is a dummy variable for a Save As You Earn option resolution. 
ESOS is a dummy variable for an Executive Share Option Scheme resolution. LTIP is a dummy variable 
for a Long Term Incentive Plan Resolution. Bonus is a dummy variable for an executive bonus resolution. 
The controls are: Emergency General Meeting is a dummy variable if event meeting is not an Annual 
General Meeting (AGM); Management against res is a dummy variable if management recommends voting 
against the resolution; Log market capitalization is the log of the firm market value at year end; ownership 
concentration is the percentage ownership of the largest shareholder; board ownership is the percentage 
ownership of the board of directors; return on assets is the profit to asset ratio. Proportion of non-executives 
percentage of outside directors on the board; board size is the number of directors on the board*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 5: CEO pay and Shareholder Directors’ Remuneration Report dissent in UK firms 
in 2006 
 
Variables Log salary Log cash pay Log total pay Equity pay 
mix 
     
Shareholder dissent on DRR 0.00 0.01 0.02* 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Controls     
Log sales 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.23*** 0.05*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) 
Book to market -0.42*** -0.40** -0.60*** -0.09 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.23) (0.08) 
Shareholder returns -0.36*** -0.23 -0.16 0.03 
 (0.13) (0.18) (0.31) (0.12) 
Stock volatility -0.31 -0.30 -0.16 0.11 
 (0.21) (0.30) (0.44) (0.15) 
CEO tenure 0.00 0.01** 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
CEO age 0.01*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Compensation consultant -0.02 0.13 0.29* 0.09 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.16) (0.08) 
Board size 0.01 0.05*** 0.05** 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Proportion of non-execs 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ownership concentration -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 3.13*** 3.31*** 2.34*** -0.38 
 (0.36) (0.48) (0.71) (0.23) 
Observations 196 196 196 196 
R-squared 0.557 0.510 0.448 0.101 
 
The table shows the determinants of CEO pay. It contains a sample of UK public firms in 2006. The 
independent variable is shareholder dissent: votes against the resolution plus abstentions divided by total 
votes cast.  CEO pay is the sum of salary, bonus, Black-Scholes value of stock option grants, restricted 
stock grants, and other pay. Equity pay mix is equity pay (the value of options and restricted stock) divided 
by CEO pay. Consultant is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a consultant and 0 otherwise; Log 
Sales is the log of firm sales revenues; Book to Market is the book value of assets divided by the market 
value of the company; Shareholder Returns are stock price appreciation plus dividends over three years; 
Volatility is the annualized standard deviation in stock prices; Job Tenure is executive time in office 
(years); Executive Age is CEO age (years); and Consultant Supplies Other Business is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if consultant provides services other than remuneration advice to the focal firm; ownership 
concentration is the percentage ownership of the largest shareholder; board ownership is the percentage 
ownership of the board of directors; return on assets is the profit to asset ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates, clustered on the firm 
identifier. 
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Table 6: CEO pay and shareholder voting in “high” dissent and “excess pay” UK firms in 
2006. 
 










Shareholder dissent on DRR 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.17) (0.01) 
Controls     
Log sales 0.33** 0.18*** 0.21 0.19*** 
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.15) (0.03) 
Book to market -0.66 -0.76*** -0.35 -0.51*** 
 (0.90) (0.27) (1.36) (0.18) 
Shareholder returns -0.37 -0.11 -0.55 -0.19 
 (1.06) (0.32) (2.17) (0.27) 
Stock volatility -0.82 -0.31 1.49 -0.31 
 (1.06) (0.82) (3.27) (0.36) 
CEO tenure 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
CEO age 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Compensation consultant 0.37 0.10 0.84 0.22 
 (0.61) (0.27) (1.20) (0.15) 
Board size 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.07*** 
 (0.18) (0.03) (0.18) (0.02) 
Proportion of non-execs 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 0.01*** 
 (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
Ownership concentration 0.03 -0.01** -0.05 -0.01** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) 
Constant 1.46 3.23*** 1.24 2.97*** 
 (2.27) (1.06) (3.80) (0.56) 
Observations 47 149 45 151 
R-squared 0.463 0.510 0.463 0.629 
 
The table shows the determinants of CEO pay. It contains a sample of UK public firms in 2006. The 
independent variable is shareholder dissent: votes against the resolution plus abstentions divided by total 
votes cast.  CEO pay is the sum of salary, bonus, Black-Scholes value of stock option grants, restricted 
stock grants, and other pay. Equity pay mix is equity pay (the value of options and restricted stock) divided 
by CEO pay. Consultant is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a consultant and 0 otherwise; Log 
Sales is the log of firm sales revenues; Book to Market is the book value of assets divided by the market 
value of the company; Shareholder Returns are stock price appreciation plus dividends over three years; 
Volatility is the annualized standard deviation in stock prices; Job Tenure is executive time in office 
(years); Executive Age is CEO age (years); and Consultant Supplies Other Business is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if consultant provides services other than remuneration advice to the focal firm; ownership 
concentration is the percentage ownership of the largest shareholder; board ownership is the percentage 
ownership of the board of directors; return on assets is the profit to asset ratio. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 





Alexander, C. R., M. A. Chen, D. J. Seppi, and C. S. Spatt. 2009. The Role of Advisory 
Services in Proxy Voting. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
15143  
Alissa, W. M. 2009. Boards’ Response to Shareholders’ Dissatisfaction: The Case of 
Shareholders’ Say on Pay in the UK. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1412880. 
Bebchuk, L., and J. Fried. 2003. Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem. In 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 71-92. 
———. 2006. Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues. In Academy of 
Management Perspectives, 18-24. 
Bebchuk, L. A., and J. M. Fried. 2004. Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Executive Remuneration. Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
Becht, M., J. Franks, C. Mayer, and S. Rossi. 2008. Returns to Shareholder Activism: 
Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund. ECGI Finance 
Working Paper No. 138. 
Black, F., and M. Scholes. 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal 
of Political Economy 81 (3):637-654. 
Booth, A. 1983. A reconsideration of trade union growth in the United Kingdom. British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 21 (3):377-391. 
Cadbury, A. 1992. Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. 
Cadman, B., M. E. Carter, and S. Hillegeist. 2008. The Role and Effect of Compensation 
Consultants on CEO Pay. In Social Science Research Network 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103682. 
Cai, J., and R. A. Walkling. 2009. Shareholders' Say on Pay: Does it Create Value?: 
SSRN. 
Carter, M. E., and V. Zamora. 2009. Shareholder Remuneration Votes and CEO 
Compensation Design. Boston University Working Paper. 
Cheffins, B. R., and R. S. Thomas. 2001. Should Shareholders have a Greater Say over 
Executive Pay?: Learning from the US Experience. SSRN eLibrary. 
Conyon, M. J., J. E. Core, and W. R. Guay. 2009a. Are Us CEOS Paid More than UK 
CEOS? Inferences from Risk-Adjusted Pay. In Social Science Research Network 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=907469 (April 6, 2009): Wharton School. 
Conyon, M. J., and D. Leech. 1994. Top Pay, Company Performance, and Corporate 
Governance. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 56 (3):229-243. 
Conyon, M. J., and K. J. Murphy. 2000. The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the 
United States and United Kingdom. Economic Journal 110:640-671. 
Conyon, M. J., S. I. Peck, and G. V. Sadler. 2009b. Compensation Consultants and 
Executive Pay:  Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Academy of Management Perspectives 23 (1):43-55. 
Core, J., and W. Guay. 1999. The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive 
levels. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28 (2):151-184. 
Core, J., W. Guay, and D. Larcker. 2003. Executive equity compensation and incentives: 
a survey. In FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 27-44. 
 39 
Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief 
executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics 51 (3):371-406. 
Del Guercio, D., L. Seery, and T. Woidtke. 2008. Do boards pay attention when 
institutional investor activists "just vote no"? Journal of Financial Economics 90 
(1):84-103. 
Deloitte. 2004. Report on the impact of the  Directors’ Remuneration  Report Regulations 
: A report for the Department of Trade and Industry. 
Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and 
consequences. The Journal of Political Economy 93 (6):1155-1155. 
DRR. 2009. Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations  2002 [cited March 2009 2009]. 
Available from http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20021986.htm. 
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Agency problems and residual claims. The Journal 
of Law and Economics 26 (2):327-327. 
Ferri, F., and D. A. Maber. 2009. Say on Pay Vote and CEO Compensation: Evidence 
from the UK. Harvard Business School and SSRN. 
Ferri, F., and T. Sandino. 2009. The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Financial 
Reporting and Compensation: The Case of Employee Stock Options Expensing. 
The Accounting Review 84 (2):433-466. 
Gillan, S. L., and L. T. Starks. 2000. Corporate governance proposals and shareholder 
activism: the role of institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 57 
(2):275-305. 
Greenbury, R. 1995. Greenbury Report: Study Group on Directors' Remuneration. 
Greene, W. H. 2007. Econometric Analysis: Prentice Hall. 
Hampel, R. 1998. Hampel Report: Corporate Governance Codes and Principles - United 
Kingdom. 
Higgs. 2003. The Higgs Report: Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors. 
Jensen, M., and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs, and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4):305-360. 
Kaplan, S. N. 2008. Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid? Academy of Management Perspectives 22 
(2):5-20. 
Karpoff, J. M., P. H. Malatesta, and R. A. Walkling. 1996. Corporate governance and 
shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 42 
(3):365-395. 
Leech, D. 2001. Shareholder voting power and corporate governance: a study of large 
British companies. Nordic Journal of Political Economy 27:33–54. 
Martin, K. J., and R. S. Thomas. 2005. When is enough, enough? Market reaction to 
highly dilutive stock option plans and the subsequent impact on CEO 
compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance 11:61 – 83. 
Morgan, A., A. Poulsen, and J. Wolf. 2006. The evolution of shareholder voting for 
executive compensation schemes. Journal of Corporate Finance 12 (4):715-737. 
Morgan, A., and J. Wolf. 2007. Approval of shareholder-sponsored proposals: Evidence 
from Canada. International Review of Financial Analysis 16 (2):136-151. 
Murphy, K. J. 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical 
analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 (1-3):11-42. 
 40 
———. 1999. Executive compensation. In Handbook of Labor Economics B2 - 
Handbook of Labor Economics, edited by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card. 
Armsterdam: North Holland. 
Murphy, K. J., and T. Sandino. 2008. Executive Pay and "Independent" Compensation 
Consultants: Marshall School of Business, Working Paper. 
Thomas, R. S., and J. F. Cotter. 2007. Shareholder proposals in the new millennium: 
Shareholder support, board response, and market reaction. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 13 (2-3):368-391. 
Thomas, R. S., and K. Martin. 1999. The effect of shareholder proposals on executive 
compensation plans. University of Cincinnati Law Review 67:1021-1081. 
———. 2000. The determinants of shareholder voting on stock option plans. Wake 
Forest Law Review 35:31-81. 




                                                 
1 We note some statistical issues. The dissent measure lies in the interval [0,1] and so 
using OLS the estimator can predict outside the range 0-1 (Greene 2007; Wooldridge 
2008; Booth 1983). We tested the sensitivity of our results by also using the transformed 
dependent variable log(p/(1-p)) where p is the percentage of dissenting shareholder votes. 
In addition, we estimated the models using other limited dependent variable econometric 
models (logit and probit). Overall, the results reported here are qualitatively unaffected 
by using these alternative estimation strategies. 
